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JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF TENANTS' PRIVATE
LAW RIGHTS: IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
HABITABILITY AND SAFETY IN
RESIDENTIAL URBAN LEASES
In 1966 the National Conference on Legal Rights of Tenants
concluded that traditional property laws "often obstruct rather than
assist in America's efforts to obtain decent housing for low-income
tenants."' A major recommendation of the Conference's report was
that the law of landlord and tenant be transformed into a flexible and
realistic tool to assure justice in housing.2 The Conference's finding
was by no means surprising. The failure of common law principles to
assure justice in modern landlord-tenant relations has long been a
focal point of criticism by legal scholars, who assert with obvious
validity that the living conditions in urban, industrial America bear
little resemblance to those of the rural, agrarian society that spawned
the common law.8 Yet it is the common law that is still applied without
question by most American courts. A judicial reevaluation of the law
of landlord-tenant, to make it compatible with modern social reality,
is long overdue.4
BACKGROUND
A. The Common Law Rights of the Tenant
The landlord-tenant relationship has traditionally been governed
by property law principles because the common law regarded a lease
1 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEGAL RIGHTS OF TENANTS, TENANTS' RIGHTS: LEGAL
TOOLS FOR BETTER HOUSING, at iii (1967) [hereinafter cited as TENANTS' RIGHTS]. The
Conference was held on December 9 and 10, 1966, in Washington, D.C., and was co-
sponsored by the Department of Justice, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and the Office of Economic Opportunity.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Dooley & Goldberg, A Model Tenants' Remedies Act, 7 HAv. J. LEGIs.
357 (1969); Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46
J. UPBAN L. 695 (1968); Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real
Property, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 275 (1966); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant:
A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Quinn & Phillips]; Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent
Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966).
4 A model landlord-tenant code has been published, but it has not yet been proposed
for adoption because the drafters believe further discussion and criticism are necessary.
Aw:ERcAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (rent. Draft 1969).
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as a conveyance of an estate for a term.5 The landlord's duty was to
deliver possession of the land,6 the quiet enjoyment of which he implic-
itly warranted would be undisturbed for the term.7 In the absence of
fraud or an express provision in the lease, the landlord assumed no
duty to repair or maintain the leased premises or to put them in order
at the beginning of the term.8 The tenant's inspection was his only
"warranty" that the premises were suitable for their intended use.9
The common law focused on possession rather than service.'0 The
ideal landlord delivered possession, then did nothing more; the ideal
tenant paid his rent and demanded nothing more than possession. The
simple possession-rent dichotomy of obligations was probably consis-
tent with both parties' expectations in rural, agrarian England, where
the right to possession constituted the essential element of the exchange.
But the low-income urban tenant of today is seeking adequate shelter,
not mere possession; he is scarcely satisfied with "quiet enjoyment"
of a decaying or rat-infested slum apartment. He needs and expects a
substantial amount of shelter-related services-heat, light, water, sanita-
tion, and maintenance-in addition to undisturbed possession,, As a
single tenant he cannot reasonably inspect or take responsibility for
maintaining the many interdependent parts of the typical multi-unit
urban dwelling.12 Yet, under the no-implied-warranty rule, it is he,
not his landlord, who assumes the risk of the premises' habitability.
Even if a landlord made express service promises in the lease,
the courts generally treated them as "secondary" obligations in the
sense that the tenant's covenant to pay rent was not affected by the
5 Evans v. Faught, 231 Cal. App. 2d 698, 42 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1965); Fowler v. Bott, 6
Mass. 63 (1809); Royal Oak Wholesale Co. v. Ford, I Mich. App. 463, 136 N.W.2d 765
(1965).
6 It has been held that this duty is satisfied by delivery of the legal right to possession
rather than by delivery of actual possession. Tietelbaum v. Direct Realty Co., 172 Misc.
48, 13 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
7 L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 233 S.W.2d 286 (1950). See Lewis, Covenant
for Quiet Enjoyment in Lease, 26 LAw' m & BANmE 80 (1933); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1414,
1420-23 (1955).
8 Lawler v. Capital City Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Carney v.
Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 204 N.E.2d 448 (1965); Irish v. Rosenbaum Co., 348 Pa. 194, 34 A.2d
486 (1943); 2 R. PowmuL, REAL PROPERTY § 233 (recomp. ed. 1967); 1 AamuaNx LAw oF
PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
9 Civale v. Meriden Housing Authority, 150 Conn. 594, 192 A.2d 548 (1963).
10 See Quinn & Phillips 227-39.
11 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,-
U.S. - (1970); see Quinn & Phillips 231-33.
12 AsmucAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 4, at 6-7.
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landlord's breach.' 3 The duty to pay rent was relieved only if the
tenant vacated the demised premises because of a breach of the land-
lord's obligation to assure quiet enjoyment for the term or when the
landlord retook possession of the property.14 American courts gradually
developed the idea of "constructive eviction," which relieved the
tenant of his rent obligation if he could show that he had vacated the
leased premises due to a severe failure of maintenance services amount-
ing to a breach of the landlord's duty to assure quiet possession.15 As
a practical matter, however, this remedy did not help the tenant to
obtain services. It simply gave him the option to abandon the premises
and cease paying rent if the failure of services was sufficiently severe.
It mitigated the rigors of the common law but, as a strictly possession-
oriented remedy, was deeply grounded in its theory. 6 With its absolute
requirement of abandonment, it is utterly unsatisfactory for a tenant
faced with today's urban housing shortage.17
It is the low-income urban tenant who suffers most from the
persistence of antiquated common law doctrines. Usually a month-to-
month tenant, 8 he has no bargaining power to impose express service
covenants upon his landlord,19 nor does he have the resources or ability
to make repairs himself. Since the common law imposes no implied
service obligations on the landlord, the deplorable result is that main-
tenance services often are never performed.
B. The Rights of the Tenant Under Modern Statutes
The legislative response to the changing social and physical con-
text of the landlord-tenant relationship has been more commendable
than that of the courts. As of 1968, over 4,900 municipalities20 and
18 Quinn & Phillips 233-34; see Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938);
Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914); Edwards v. Ward
Associates, Inc., 367 S.W.2d 890 (rex. Civ. App. 1963); REsTATEmENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 290
(1932); 1 AmRcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, at § 3.79.
14 See Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 (1870); Fifth Ave. Bldg. Corp. v.
Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); 1 AmmucAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, supra note
8, at §§ 3.49-.50.
15 See, e.g., Overstreet v. Rhodes, 212 Ga. 521, 93 S.E.2d 715 (1956); Nesson v. Adams,
212 Mass. 429, 99 N.E. 93 (1912); Sewell v. Hukill, 138 Mont. 242, 356 P.2d 39 (1960).
16 Quinn & Phillips 235-39.
17 Schoshinski, supra note 3, at 530; Comment, Tenants' Remedies in the District of
Columbia: New Hope for Reform, 18 CATHOLIC U.L. R-v. 80, 83 (1968).
18 Quinn & Phillips 243; Schoshinski, supra note 3, at 541-42.
19 TE ANTs' RIGnHs 5.
20 F. GRAD, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR HOUSING CODE VIOLATIONS 112 (National Comm'n on
Urban Problems Research Rep. No. 14, 1968) [hereinafter cited as GRAD].
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many states had enacted housing codes that set minimum standards
of sanitation and safety which landlords are obligated to maintain in
leased dwellings.21 Although these codes have greatly increased tenants'
protection and represent governmental recognition of the common
law's failure,22 they have not substantially affected the tenant's private
law rights.23
Housing code provisions are usually enforceable only by municipal
authorities, not by the individual tenant. 24 In 1939 the New York
Court of Appeals held that a housing code vested no private contractual
rights in the tenant and that the statutory duty to maintain leased
premises was owed only to the municipality. 25 This decision has been
widely followed,2 with the result that a tenant has to rely on a munici-
pal agency to seek correction of code violations. The agency, through
lack of manpower, inefficiency, corruption, or mere indifference, may
never act effectively on his complaint.27 Even if it does act, the resulting
penalty may be so small28 that in reality it constitutes only an extra cost
of doing business rather than any real incentive to actual compliance.29
Criminal penalties for code violations are rare30 and likewise do not
generally result in actual correction of the violation.31 The National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reported that in spite of the
existence of municipal enforcement agencies, thousands of landlords in
disadvantaged areas were able to violate the codes with impunity.32
The indigent urban tenant has few private rights and little real
power, either under antiquated common law rules or under modern
housing codes, to force his landlord to make needed repairs or to
21 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 19-342 to -375 (1968); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 144,
§§ 1-98 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13-A-1 to -A-28 (Supp. 1970).
22 See Quinn & Phillips 239.
23 GRAD 112.
24 Id. at 113; TENANTs" RlGrrs 5.
25 Davar Holdings, Inc. v. Cohen, 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E2d 882 (1939), aff'g 255 App.
Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1st Dep't 1938).
26 See GRAD 113.
27 See id. at 7-33; Quinn & Phillips 239-42. For an analysis of enforcement problems
in Denver, see Comment, Housing for the Poor: A Study of the Landlord-Tenant Relation-
ship, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 541, 542-50 (1969).
28 The average fine per case in New York City in 1965 was estimated to be $16. P.
WALD, LAw AND Povaar: 1965, at 15 (1965). It has been remarked that these fines carry
all the moral opprobrium of a traffic ticket. Quinn & Phillips 241.
29 "In many states, fines levied for housing code violations are so small that they
may properly be considered as establishing a system of licensing rather than as constitu-
ting an effective deterrent." Levi, supra note 3, at 278.
30 Quinn & Phillips 240.
31 GRAD 29.
32 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVIsORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsoRnmts 472 (Bantam
ed. 1968). See Levi, supra note 3, at 276.
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provide minimum services. Imaginative legislation expanding tenants'
rights, as has been passed recently in some states, 33 is perhaps the best
way to rectify this situation. It is, however, the absence of judicial,
rather than legislative, innovation in this area that is so startling. Most
courts have refused the implied invitation provided by statutory reform
and housing codes, and indeed, by the obvious conditions of life in
urban America, to discard outmoded precedents and adjust the law of
landlord and tenant to fit modern social reality.3 4
II
JUDIcIAL EXPANSION OF TENANTS' RIGHTS
Some courts, of course, have sought to bring landlord-tenant law
into the twentieth century. But their efforts, though commendable,
have generally failed to reexamine comprehensively the nature of the
modern landlord-tenant relationship or to provide a unified theoretical
justification for change.
In 1961 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Pines v. Perssion,8 held
that there was an implied warranty that leased premises were habitable
at the beginning of the term. In Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,36 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a lease of premises by
a landlord with knowledge that they are in violation of the housing
code is an illegal, unenforceable contract. In both cases, however, the
tenant who was relieved of his rent obligation had already vacated,
which gives rise to the suspicion that the courts may simply have been
using new language to justify what was essentially the old defense of
constructive eviction. 7 The Pines case, since it involved furnished
33 New York City has been by far the most progressive in expanding tenants' rights
to enforce housing codes. See HOusING FOR THE POOR: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 95-97
(N. Dorsen & S. Zimmerman eds. 1967). Massachusetts has passed legislation permitting
rent withholding, rent receivership, and rent escrow in tenant-initiated attempts at housing
code enforcement. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127C-27J (1967); id. ch. 239, § 8A (Supp.
1969). For a list of states that have enacted rent abatement and "repair and deduct"
laws, see notes 71-72 infra. The Conference on Tenants' Rights stressed legislation as
the most effective way to give tenants greater power. TENANTS' RIGHTS 19.
84 See Garrity, supra note 3, at 698.
85 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
86 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
87 See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), where the court
denied a landlord's action for rent on the ground of constructive eviction, but said it
was immaterial whether the tenant's right to vacate is expressed in terms of breach of
covenant of quiet possession, material failure of consideration, or material breach of an im-
plied warranty against defects.
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premises, arguably may have been merely another example of the
traditional "furnished house" exception to the no-implied-warranty
rule.33 In any event, it did not deal with the problem of housing code
violations that develop after the lease has begun. The Brown case
provided only a specious advantage to the tenant as it did not state what
the tenant's rights under the illegal contract would have been had he
elected to stay. 9 The tenant needs a means to compel his landlord to
maintain and repair, not a means to avoid the lease. At best, both
Brown and Pines constitute only partial advancements. That they have
been regarded as judicial milestones40 is a measure of the remaining
distance to a modernized law of landlord and tenant.
Another partial advancement was the 1968 case of Edwards v.
Habib,41 in which the court held that evictions in retaliation for tenant
complaints to housing code officials were implicitly prohibited by the
code itself, and that proof of a landlord's retaliatory motive constituted
a good defense to such an action.42 Again, however, the tenant's advan-
tage under this holding is questionable. Since most slum tenancies are
month-to-month, 43 the landlord is fully within his common law rights
to evict or raise the rent without reason thirty days after notice is
given.44 Even if a landlord's action of eviction is denied as retaliatory,
he still has the right to bring another action thirty days later, in which
case the tenant will again have to prove retaliatory motive. Proving
the real motive of the landlord, needless to say, may be a very difficult
task.45
What is needed is not a partial advancement within .the old com-
mon law framework but a wholesale judicial reexamination of the
landlord-tenant relationship in the light of modern social patterns
and housing conditions. The law and the rightful expectations of
today's tenants must be brought into better harmony. Both to comple-
ment legislative reform and to provide needed flexibility in an area
8 Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843), first held that there was an
implied warranty of habitability in a short-term lease of furnished premises. See Ingalls
v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
39 See Schoshinski, supra note 3, at 588; 21 BAYLOR L. REv. 372 (1969).
40 See GRAD 121-23.
41 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
42 397 F.2d at 700-03.
43 Text accompanying note 18 supra.
44 1 AM EPCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 8, at § 3.90. This rule has been in-
corporated by statute in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-902, 45-910 (1967).
45 Massachusetts, however, provides that if the tenant can show he made code viola-
tion complaints in a six-month period prior to an eviction action, a rebuttable pre-
sumption arises that the eviction is retaliatory. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 2A (Supp.
1969).
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where mechanical application of outmoded precedents has been the
practice, the traditional reluctance of the courts to deal with landlord-
tenant problems in honest and innovative ways should yield to a new
approach. There are recent hopeful signs that it may.
A. Judicially Implied Warranties of Habitability
In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,46 the District of Columbia
Circuit denied relief in a landlord's action for possession based upon
nonpayment of rent on the ground that a warranty of housing code
compliance was implied by law into all leases of urban dwelling units
covered by the District of Columbia's housing code.47 Several tenants
had refused to pay rent, alleging that there were 1,500 violations of the
code in their building.4 Noting its duty to "reappraise old doctrines in
the light of the facts and values of contemporary life," the court
concluded that the "old rules of property law' governing leases are
inappropriate for today's transactions." 49 Both the common law, as
properly construed and expanded, and the implicit mandate of the
housing code itself compelled judicial recognition of implied warran-
ties of habitability in urban leases.
The court specified three considerations militating toward com-
mon law recognition of implied lease warranties. First, the factual
assumptions underlying the old no-repair rule are obsolete in today's
urban setting, and without them the rule cannot be justified.50 The
modern urban tenant, unlike his medieval counterpart, is primarily
interested in shelter and shelter-related services, not land.51 He usually
possesses a single specialized skill and is not competent to perform
maintenance chores even if he is able to gain access to the necessary
equipment and to areas within the landlord's control.52 The landlord
has ultimate control of the building, and he should have the corre-
sponding duty to maintain it. As well suited as the traditional law of
40 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1970).
47 428 F.2d at 1072-73.
48 Id. at 1073. All the violations arose after the term of the lease had commenced. Id.
49 Id. at 1074-75.
50 Id. at 1078.
51 When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they
seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes not
merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, service-
able plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper
maintenance.
Id. at 1074 (footnote omitted). See Quinn & Phillips 231-33.
52 428 F.2d at 1078. Even if the tenant possessed the necessary competence and had
access to the necessary areas, the length of his tenure might not justify any efforts at
repair. The court noted the increasing mobility of the present-day tenant. Id.
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leaseholds, including the no-repair rule, may have been to an agrarian
economy where tenants were "jack-of-all-trades" farmers, it is concep-
tually incompatible with urban life styles.5 3 Because the social and
historical facts that were its basis no longer prevail, courts should
recognize that the old law lacks validity when applied to urban
housing."
Secondly, the court reasoned that implied warranties should be
imposed in leases because they have increasingly been imposed in
related areas of the law. The court noted the wide acceptance of
implied warranties of quality in the law of sales, 5 and that such
warranties have been judicially implied in transactions involving the
lease of a chattel50 and the sale of real property.57 Since the modem
lease is essentially a purchase of shelter and services rather than a
conveyance of an estate, the contract law of sales, with its implied
warranty of quality, is better suited to determine the respective
obligations of the landlord and tenant than the outdated law of prop-
erty. The landlord, as a merchant in housing, has greater "opportunity,
incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain the condition of his
building"58 than the tenant, and it is only logical to impose upon him
the obligation to do so as well. The modern tenant must rely upon
his landlord's skill and honesty as much as the purchaser of a chattel
must rely upon that of his supplier.59 The protection that the law of
sales affords purchasers should not disappear when the purchase in-
volves shelter.
The third rationale for common law recognition of implied war-
ranties of habitability in leases involves the power inequities in the
landlord-tenant relationship itself. The court noted that the chronic
53 Id.
54 The court in a footnote stated that the modem tenant, because of his primary
interest in shelter, resembles the guest at an inn more than the agrarian tenant, and that
substantial obligations were placed upon innkeepers at common law. Id. at 1077 n.33. The
court thus presaged its holding in Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., No. 23,401
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970), discussed at text accompanying notes 84-114 infra.
55 428 F.2d at 1075. See UNIFORM COMMERaCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315; W. PROssER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTs § 97 (3d ed. 1964); Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability
and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. Rv. 493 (1962); Prosser, The
Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1945).
56 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serm., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
57 See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 899 (1964); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,
91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d
286 (1960); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Haskell,
The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J.
633 (1965).
58 428 F.2d at 1079.
9 The court compared the tenant to the purchaser of a car. Id.
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urban housing shortage has given the landlord vastly superior bargain-
ing power and deprived the tenant of any private leverage with which
to compel maintenance services. Because he does not face the economic
threat of vacant apartments, the landlord has little incentive to volun-
tarily make repairs. The court seemed to recognize that since social
and economic conditions in urban America do not compel landlords
to make repairs, the law must.6 0
An alternative ground for the court's holding was that the housing
code itself requires an implied lease warranty of code compliance.
Although the code is silent on the question of private remedies,61 the
court reasoned that by entering into the lease the landlord undertakes
to maintain the premises in accord with all applicable law. Since
official enforcement of the code has been "far from uniformly effec-
tive," 62 the tenant should be able privately to compel the landlord to
perform his undertaking. Such a private right is compatible with the
spirit if not the letter of the code. The court stated that "the old no-
repair rule cannot coexist with the obligations imposed on the landlord
by a typical modem housing code, and must be abandoned in favor
of an implied warranty of habitability." 63 Whether it is ultimately the
housing code itself or a just application of the common law that re-
quires the lease warranty, it is clear that code compliance is the only
standard of performance that will satisfy the warranty.64
Following its own dictate that leases should be interpreted and
construed like any other contract, the court held that the tenant's duty
to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's satisfactory performance
of his duty to comply with the code. If the trier of fact finds that the
landlord has breached his code service obligations in such a way as to
constitute total breach, then the entire rental obligation for the period
during which the violations persisted is extinguished, and the land-
lord's action for possession fails. If the trier finds that only a partial
breach has occurred, then a proportionate part of the rent is extin-
guished until repairs are made, and by paying the remainder, the
tenant defeats the landlord's action for possession.65
In this one opinion some of the most firmly entrenched principles
60 Id. at 1079-80.
61 Id. at 1080-81. The court noted, however, that some cases have held that the
housing code creates a standard of care that is relevant in tort actions by a tenant. See,
e.g., Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
62 428 F.2d at 1082 (footnote omitted).
63 Id. at 1076-77 (footnotes omitted).
64 Id. at 1077.
65 Id. at 1082-85.
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of the common law have been uprooted. The court discarded the
traditional ideas that a lease is a conveyance of land rather than a
contract for services, that there is no implied warranty of habitability
or' duty to repair, and that lease covenants are independent.66 But the
long-range significance of the case may lie not in its specific rejection
of these antiquated doctrines but in the way it rejected them. The
court justified its holding largely by reference to the realities of life
in urban America, and without apology or hesitation it adopted an
entirely new framework within which to resolve landlord-tenant dis-
putes-that of the law of sales. It has thus provided a solid theoretical
basis for future reform and a precedent for radical judicial shifts away
from moribund common law doctrines.
The implied warranty of housing code compliance gives the tenant
a private contractual remedy against the violating landlord;67 instead
of relying on inept or ineffectual municipal authorities, he can sue the
landlord directly. What was a violation has become a breach, and what
was paternalistic protection has been translated into a private right to
decent living quarters. The opportunity to seek direct judicial redress
of the dangers and discomforts of substandard housing may eliminate
the frustration and sense of impotence that has so often been the only
reward of a tenant's recourse to municipal enforcement.6 , The measure
of damages in a direct suit may be the cost of repairs,6 9 but it could con-
06 Two other recent cases, although not approaching the breadth of the Javins hold-
ing, have evidenced a similar judicial willingness to discard the underlying principles
of the common law. See Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 150, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The Lemle case involved a "Tahitian"-style beach house,
which arguably reduces its value as precedent to urban tenants. In addition, the cause
of the uninhabitability of the premises (rats) existed at the time the lease was made. In
Javins it was stipulated that the premises complied with the code at the beginning of the
term. Note 48 supra. In Marini the degree to which the court relied upon the specific
lease terms themselves and the intention of the parties is uncertain. In any event, neither
Lemle nor Marini keyed the duty to repair to the requirements of a housing code. See
also Lund v. MacArthur, 462 r.2d 482 (Hawaii 1969).
67 Although the court only considered the tenant's defensive rights-i.e., his right
to deduct rent in proportion to the landlord's breach-an affirmative right of enforcement
can be inferred from the court's recognition that the modern lease is essentially a con-
tract and from the existence of an affirmative right to enforce implied covenants of quiet
enjoyment at common law. See Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33, 37-38, 164 N.E. 807,
809 (1929).
18 Text accompanying note 27 supra; see Note, Private Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Regulations, 54 IoWA L. R-v. 580, 582-84 (1969).
09 See, e.g., Childress v. Tyson, 200 Ark. 1129, 143 S.W.2d 45 (1940); Mills v. Ruppert,
167 Cal. App. 2d 58, 333 P.2d 818 (1959); Schoshinski, supra note 3, at 527; Comment,
supra note 27, at 565.
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ceivably include compensation for the period the tenant had to live
with the violation.70
By applying the contractual doctrine of dependent covenants, the
Javins court has given the tenant an even more effective means than
direct judicial action to enforce the landlord's implied warranty ob-
ligations. The "proportionate rent impairment" theory of Javins is
similar to the rent abatement 7 and "repair and deduct ' 72 statutes a
few states have enacted. With each of these remedies the landlord
suffers an immediate financial loss by not maintaining leased premises
according to code standards; this clearly provides a greater incentive
to make repairs than the "traffic ticket" system of code enforcement
in some municipalities.7 3 As the court in Javins suggested, a judicial
determination of the severity of the violation and the amount of rent
thereby extinguished may be necessary to prevent tenant abuse of the
privilege, but the burden of awaiting that judicial determination must
be borne by the offending landlord rather than the tenant.7 4
Application of the contractual doctrine of dependent covenants
to leases should also obviate the doctrine of constructive eviction. Essen-
tially a mitigation of the severity of the independent covenant rule,75
it has no role to play when the rule itself is overturned. Although the
tenant would, of course, still have the option to vacate, the relevant
judicial inquiry should be whether the landlord's code violation con-
stituted a material breach justifying rescission of the lease contract,
not whether it so interfered with quiet enjoyment that it amounted to
eviction.
The implied warranty of code compliance may also affect the tort
liability of the landlord. Under the traditional view that housing codes
impose only a civic duty, there has been a split of authority as to what
70 See TENANTs' R1GHTs 2, 12; Quinn & Phillips 256. It has even been suggested that
punitive damages be assessed against the landlord because his failure to repair con-
stitutes intentional infliction of mental distress. Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort,
65 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
71 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1969); N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 302-A
(McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1970).
72 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §8 1941-42 (West 1954); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. §§ 42-201
to -202 (1947); NJ). CFNT. CODE 88 47-16-12 to -13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31-32
(1954).
73 Note 28 supra.
74 428 F.2d at 1082-83.
75 Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (Hawaii 1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
53 N.J. 444, 460, 251 A.2d 268, 276 (1969); see 1 AmERicAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note
8, at § 3.51.
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role the code should play in determining the landlord's negligence when
the tenant sustains injuries due to a violation. One judicial interpreta-
tion is that a code violation constitutes negligence per se,76 a second
that it is merely relevant evidence of negligence that may be considered
by the jury,77 and a third that it is irrelevant to the determination of
negligence.78 The imposition of a duty owed directly to the tenant
arguably militates toward adoption of the per se rule. In addition, there
are several cases imposing liability for negligence on the landlord for
breach of an express contractual covenant to repair or maintain79 which
could supply valuable precedents for the tenant seeking to prove negli-
gence in the breach of an implied covenant. There is no reason why
housing code standards, once they are recognized as the measure of the
landlord's contractual duty to the tenant, cannot also be recognized as
the measure of reasonable care in determining negligence.
There is a possibility, however, that the question of negligence
may never arise. In Javins the court stressed that the modem tenant
lacks the ability and expertise adequately to evaluate the premises'
suitability, and that he must rely largely upon the skill and good faith
of his landlord. 0 In relating the law of landlord and tenant to the
law of sales, the court noted the similarity between the individual's roles
as tenant and consumer.8' If a housing code violation can reasonably
be postulated as constituting a "defect" in the product being sold-i.e.,
habitable living space-it is possible that the landlord may be liable
without a showing of negligence for tenant injuries due to violations.
Products liability is a consistent and logical extension of the court's
conclusion that the modern lease is essentially a sale of shelter.82 There
is really no logical reason to subject an individual to greater risks as
76 McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Oglesby v.
Rutledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497 (1942); Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541,
40 N.W.2d 719 (1950); McLain v. Haley, 53 N.M. 327, 207 P.2d 1013 (1949).
77 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
78 Stapleton v. Cohen, 853 Mass. 53, 228 N.E.2d 64 (1967); Ellis v. Caprice, 96 NJ.
Super. 539, 233 A.2d 654 (1967); Newman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 ND. 466, 43 N.W.2d
411 (1950); Alfe v. New York Life Ins. Co., 180 Okla. 87, 67 P.2d 947 (1937).
79 See, e.g., Collison v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919); Dean v. Hershowitz,
119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); Lommori v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 63 N.M. 342, 319 P-,d
949 (1957); Rampone v. Wanskuck Bldgs., Inc., 102 R.I. 80, 227 A.2d 586 (1967); REsrATi-
UXT" (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965).
80 428 F.2d at 1078-79.
81 Id. at 1074-76, 1078-79.
82 If strict liability is imposed, neither the landlord's lack of notice of the violation
nor the tenant's contributory negligence will defeat recovery.
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a tenant than he faces as a consumer by distinguishing between injuries
caused by defective chattels and those caused by defective realty. 83
B. Implied Duty of Protection
In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,8 4 decided
only three months after Javins, the District of Columbia Circuit again
expanded the scope of the landlord's duty, holding that he is obliged
to take reasonable precautions to protect his tenants from the foresee-
able criminal acts of third persons. In 1966 a female tenant was
assaulted and robbed by an intruder8 5 in a common hallway of a
combined office and apartment building. In reversing the district
court's decision in favor of the landlord and remanding on the issue
of damages, the court noted that prior to the assault in question the
apartment building had experienced a "rising wave of crime";8 6 that
the landlord had both actual and constructive notice of this fact;87
and that the security measures existing in 1959, when the tenant first
moved into the building, had been discontinued. 8 The court reiterated
the general rule that a private person has no obligation to protect an-
other from the criminal acts of third persons,89 and noted that it had
previously applied the rule in landlord-tenant disputes. 90 But, according
to the court, the rule faltered in light of the conditions of contemporary
urban apartment living: "The landlord is no insurer of his tenants'
safety, but he certainly is no bystander."9' 1 The risk of predictable crim-
inal intrusion could, for the most part, be guarded against only by the
landlord. There is no unfairness in imposing a duty to protect upon
83 Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINs LJ.
458, 458-59 (1970). Strict liability has already invaded the law of real property in the sale
of housing. E.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
84 No. 23,401 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
85 The court consistently assumed that the assailant was an intruder. It stated that
it was "unlikely" that he was a patron of one of the lower floor businesses, and hinted
that the foreseeability of the attack, not the nature of the attacker, made the landlord
liable. Id. at 18-20 & n.24. Judge MacKinnon, dissenting, argued that since it had not been
proven that the attacker was an intruder, plaintiff had not shown proximate cause. Id.
at 24.
88 Id. at 11.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2-3.
89 Id. at 6. See RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) or TORTS §§ 314-15 (1965); W. PROssER, supra
note 55, § 54, at 384-39.
90 Appelbaum v. Kidwell, 12 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1926). See Goldberg v. Housing
Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48
Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1965).
91 No. 23,401, at 7 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970),
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him when he has notice of repeated crimes committed against tenants,
has every reason to expect them to continue, and possesses the "exclusive
power to take preventive action."92
The court likened the modem landlord-tenant relationship to
that of innkeeper and guest. At common law an innkeeper has the duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect his guests from abuse or assaults by
third persons. 93 The rationale behind the imposition of the duty, ac-
cording to the court, seemed to be that the party having control of the
premises, and the corresponding power to take security precautions,
should bear legal responsibility for doing so.94 The court, recalling that
it had relied upon a similar rationale in imposing the duty to maintain
and repair upon the landlord in Javins, concluded that the landlord's
control obliged him, as it does an innkeeper, to take reasonable pre-
cautions to prevent tenant injuries due to predictable criminal acts.95
It is immediately apparent that Kline is a valuable analogue of
Javins, expanding the tenant's protection in a different direction and,
partially at least, within a different theoretical framework, but with
a similar concern for his welfare. Javins gives the tenant an implied
contractual right to habitable living quarters, while Kline gives him
an implied contractual right to reasonable security from the criminal
acts of third persons. In both cases the court emphasized the modem
tenant's lack of capacity to act effectively on his own, whether it be to
make repairs or to provide protective measures, and reasoned that "the
92 Id.
93 Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. App. 2d 656, 807 P.2d 869 (1957); Priewe v. Bartz, 249
Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116 (1957); RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 314A(2) (1965); Annot.,
70 A.L.R.2d 628, 645 (1960).
Innkeeper-guest is one of several "special" relationships in which this duty has been
imposed. The other relationships include landowner-invitee, businessman-patron, em-
ployer-employee, school district-pupil, hospital-patient, and carrier-passenger. See RESTATE-
Mirr (SECOND) Or TORTS § 314A (1965).
94 No. 23,401, at 10 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
95 Two previous cases have imposed a somewhat similar duty in different fact situa-
tions. See Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969) (allegations of tenant
assaulted by intruder in apartment that landlord negligently failed to provide reasonable
protection sufficient to preclude summary judgment); Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J.
Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (1964) (public housing authority liable for not providing sufficient
supervisory personnel so as to render children's playground safe). See generally Kendall v.
Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (landlord liable for negligence in hiring
painter who murdered tenant); Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d
801 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (public housing authority liable for failing to provide sufficient police
protection after it had freely assumed the duty to provide some protection). In New
York City Housing Authority v. Medlin, 57 Misc. 2d 145, 291 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1968),
however, the court held that there was no affirmative tenant right to compel better police
protection in a public housing project.
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logic of the situation itself" required imposing the duty on the land-
lord.0 Javins would place the landlord-tenant relationship within the
legal purview of the law of sales, while Kline would place it within that
of the common law of innkeeper and guest. This double-gauged theo-
retical approach is a strength rather than a weakness because it supplies
a broader base for future innovation and growth. The court has not
been inconsistent, but rather has shown a consistent disdain for the
traditional common law of landlord and tenant.
The factual context of the Kline case, however, partially obscures
the scope of the holding. It appeared that when Miss Kline first moved
into the building in 1959, at least one clerk and a doorman were on
duty in the main lobby at all times, and that the side entrances to the
building were guarded or locked. Miss Kline testified at the trial that
the security precautions the landlord had taken had at least partially
motivated her to enter the lease. At the time of the assault, however,
there were no doormen, no attendants watching the side entrances,
and a desk clerk was on duty only sporadically.97 The question arises
as to whether the duty to protect had its roots in the specific factual
undertaking of the landlord-i.e., in the 1959 precautions taken and
negligently abandoned-or was inherent in the lease relationship itself.
In other words, did the Kline court intend to impose the duty to pro-
tect upon all District of Columbia landlords, or just upon those who
have taken some initial protective measures upon which the tenant
relies?
If the duty to protect, and the corresponding liability for viola-
tion of the duty, arose by virtue of the specific security measures taken
and later abandoned by the landlord, then the Kline court has not
really imposed any substantial new obligations on landlords, and the
case easily fits within the traditional legal categories. While it is true
that one ordinarily does not have an affirmative duty to protect others
from criminal attacks, it is also true that any undertaking, once
assumed, must be performed with reasonable care or the actor will be
liable in tort for resulting injuries.98 The distinction is the common one
between nonfeasance and misfeasance. Kline could arguably constitute
merely another imposition of misfeasance liability. It could also be
argued that the 1959 security measures, since they at least partially in-
duced Miss Kline to enter the lease, were an implicit part of the con-
96 No. 23,401, at 12 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970); 428 F.2d at 1077-80.
97 No. 23,401, at 2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
98 See Bass v. City of New York, 61 Misc. 2d 465, 305 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
W. PRosssR, supra note 55, at § 54; ci. Bailey v. Zlotnick, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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sideration of the original contract; 99 or, alternatively, constituted the
entire consideration from the landlord in a separate implied-in-fact
contract,100 with Miss Kline's reliance constituting her considera-
tion. 01 Under all three possibilities, grounded as they are in factual
considerations, the landlord could avoid liability simply by failing to
provide initial security measures. Rather than making protective mea-
sures mandatory on pain of liability, the court would have fashioned
an effective deterrent to initial voluntary implementation of such mea-
sures.
It seems certain, however, that the Kline court intended to impose
the duty to protect as an incident of the lease relationship itself,10 2 and
that the holding is not to be narrowed to its facts. The court attempted,
perhaps unsuccessfully, to outline the general contours of the duty it
imposed and what standard of performance in various situations would
satisfy it' 0 3 -clearly an unnecessary effort if the decision only reaches
those landlords guilty of misfeasance. In addition, the duty to repair
in Javins was imposed by virtue of the lease relationship itself; 0 4 Kline
would be less than full brother to that decision if its holding is viewed
as based in fact. Both decisions relied upon the "logic of the situation
itself" as requiring the imposition of their respective duties, which in
context clearly refers to the general landlord-tenant relationship rather
than a specific factual situation. It seems fair to conclude that where
Javins imposed an "implied warranty of housing code compliance,"
Kline imposed an "implied warranty of reasonable safety from criminal
attacks," and that all landlords in the District of Columbia make both
warranties by merely entering the lease. The tenant will presumably
09 At the time of the assault the term of the original lease had expired, and Miss
Kline was a month-to-month tenant. The majority concluded that this fact did not alter
the original lease obligations. No. 23,401, at 14-15 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970). Judge MacKin-
non, dissenting, argued that plaintiff could recover for breach only if there had been a
lessening of the protective measures during the current month. Id. at 29.
100 See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 5 (1932); 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 18 (1952).
101 "The tenant was led to expect that she could rely upon this degree of pro-
tection." No. 23,401, at 17 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970). See Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa.
284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968), where plaintiff tenants' reasonable reliance upon an oral promise
to repair a patently defective porch constituted consideration, and where a tort claim.
against the landlord for negligent failure to perform a contractual duty was upheld. See
generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932); Seavy, Reliance upon Gratuitous Prom-
ises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REv. 913 (1951).
102 The court spoke in terms of "a duty of protection owed by the landlord to the
tenant in an urban multiple unit apartment dwelling." No. 23,401, at 12 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
6, 1970).
103 Id. at 15-18, 20.
104 428 F.2d at 1077-80.
[Vol. 56:489
TENANTS' RIGHTS
have affirmative enforcement rights under this second warranty as he
did under the first, thereby increasing his chances to avoid injury due
to criminal attacks, if he can prove that his landlord is not providing
"reasonable" security.
What constitutes "reasonable" security measures is a major gray
area in the court's decision. Giving a standard tort definition of "rea-
sonable care in all the circumstances,"'1 5 the court concluded that had
the defendant continued the security measures in effect in 1959, he
would have satisfied his duty to protect, but that different standards of
care may be required in different factual contexts. 10 6 The court, by
delineating the standard of care in very general language, obviously did
not approach the exactitude it achieved in the Javins holding. There,
the duty was to maintain the premises' "habitability," and the housing
regulations provided a ready statutory definition of the term. There is
no corresponding statutory reference by which to define the Kline
standard of care.
In Kline the court considered three factors that may be weighed
in determining the standard of care: (1) the customary care taken in
similar buildings, 10 7 (2) the degree of control the tenant has over the
premises, 08 and (3) the extent to which the landlord has had notice that
crimes were frequently committed in the building.09 The only factor
analyzed in depth by the court is the last, and it was the subject of dis-
pute, with the dissenting judge contending that the notice requirement
was not met.110 It appeared that the record, although evidencing twenty
thefts in the building in a brief period prior to the assault in question,
showed only one other assault."" If this constituted notice to a land-
lord, argued the dissent, then the majority indeed fashioned a broad
rule of landlord liability." 2
The court's failure to supply an intelligible standard of care, though
perhaps unavoidable, works a hardship on landlords. Criminal acts are
by their nature unpredictable;" 3 to impose liability for failure to rea-
sonably guard against "predictable" criminal acts is something of a con-
tradiction in terms. After Kline the District of Columbia landlord has
105 No. 23,401, at 15 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
106 Id. at 17, 20.
107 Id. at 16.
108 Id. at 15-16 n.21.
109 Id. at 3-5, 7, 11, 18.
110 Id. at 23-24 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 23.
112 "One swallow just does not make a summer." rd.
113 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 302B, comment d at 89 (1965); W. Paossmt,
supra note 55, § 33, at 176.
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little doubt about the fact of his duty, but has little certainty as to what
will satisfy it. Lacking this certainty, he may institute more stringent
security measures than would otherwise be necessary in an effort to
avoid liability. Despite the court's protestations of a contrary intent,
he may then become an insurer of his tenants' safety.114
CONCLUSION
The court in Javins and Kline has dramatically expanded the im-
plied service obligations of the modem urban landlord. In the District
of Columbia at least, by entering a lease the landlord now undertakes
not only to deliver possession and to assure quiet enjoyment, but to
comply with the housing code and to provide reasonable security mea-
sures as well. The tenant has been given no small measure of relief
from the psychic assaults and physical hazards of building decay and
rising crime.115 In addition, the court has adopted two new decisional
frameworks, the developed laws of sales and innkeeper-guest, within
which to resolve landlord-tenant disputes, thus providing a flexible
basis for future legal growth in the area.
Perhaps the ultimate significance of Javins and Kline, however,
will not be that they gave the tenant greater protection in two im-
portant areas, but that they did so largely upon a reasoned analysis of
the requirements of justice in the modem urban setting. In resolving
both cases the court did not look to precedent but to the realities of
contemporary urban life.116 The implicit holding of the cases is that
the modem lease creates a continuing dependency relationship in which
the landlord has certain inherent service duties. The common law of
landlord and tenant, which gave minimal attention to service duties,
therefore must be modernized to reflect this dependency relationship.
For seeking to do this the Javins and Kline court is to be commended;
hopefully, it will also be emulated.
John L. Zenor
114 The court explidtly stated that the landlord is justified in passing on the cost
of protective measures to his tenants. The increased rent may in a sense constitute a
"premium" for the protection. The court also hinted that landlords may not be per-
mitted to avoid their duty through exculpatory clauses, thus in a sense making the
"coverage" mandatory. No. 23401, at 15 n.20, 20-21 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 6, 1970).
115 See id. at 25 n.4, 29 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), where Washington's high crime
rate is noted.
116 See, e.g., id. at 12.
